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A B S T R A C T   
Developing a governance framework for Marine Genetic Resources (MGRs) is a crucial element of the proposed 
treaty on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(BBNJ). Negotiating countries’ positions on MGRs, including questions on the sharing of benefits from their use, 
range from no regulation to elaborate infrastructure for access and benefit sharing (ABS) of all MGRs. This article 
proposes a Tiered Approach to MGR governance that finds a middle ground between negotiating countries’ 
positions on ABS and aims to foster scientific research on samples and data, protect traditional and local 
knowledge, promote consistency with existing ABS frameworks within national jurisdiction and address con-
servation gaps including the absence of a biosafety framework. This practical activities approach to MGR 
governance provides an alternative to the ‘one size fits all’ approach to ABS currently under negotiation with 
range of governance options more suited to ABNJ’s unique environmental and geo-political conditions. These 
include an ABNJ Activity Notification and Monitoring System, a Facilitated Information and Sample Sharing 
Hub, an ABNJ Benefit Sharing System and an End-user Due Diligence approach to monitoring and benefit 
sharing. This article concludes that MGR governance should implement the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea’s vision for an ‘equitable and efficient’ utilisation of resources and protection of the marine envi-
ronment, offering a range of tools and approaches that complement ABS, but that are more diverse and flexible 
than the ABS concept alone.   
1. Introduction 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) forms 
the ‘Constitution of the Seas and Oceans’ and, among other things, 
provides a framework for environmental protection, scientific research 
and technology transfer in different maritime zones [1]. The zones 
include States’ territorial waters, the continental shelf, the exclusive 
economic zone (all areas within national jurisdiction) and areas beyond 
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national jurisdiction (ABNJ), which is comprised of the High Seas water 
column and the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil below the High Seas 
water column (‘The Area’). Marine genetic resources (MGRs) are the 
biological building blocks for biodiversity in all of these areas. Gover-
nance of MGRs within national jurisdiction is affected by a range of in-
ternational, national and local measures and tools. Conservation tools 
include those that protect the genetic diversity of wild species, such as 
biosecurity to manage the spread of disease, protected species regula-
tions and biosafety measures that manage the risks of genetically engi-
neered organisms. Tools for sustainable use of marine biodiversity 
include regulating the access to, and use of MGRs. Although technolo-
gies are making it easier to conduct activities in ABNJ, there are sig-
nificant international governance gaps due to the fact that countries do 
not have sovereign rights to adopt effective measures for MGRs in these 
areas. In response, United Nations countries agreed to negotiate an in-
ternational legally binding instrument (ILBI) under UNCLOS on the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of ABNJ 
[2]. This article: (1) explores the negotiators’ approach to date; (2) ar-
gues that the focus on a narrow, ‘one size fits all’ approach does not take 
into account the unique characteristics of ABNJ environmental and 
geo-political conditions; and (3) offers a practical pathway, called the 
Tiered Approach, for a more sustainable, equitable and efficient MGR 
governance regime that could accommodate technological advances and 
increase conservation measures for ABNJ. 
At the first negotiating session for the ILBI, delegations reaffirmed 
that it ‘should operationalize and strengthen the provisions of UNCLOS 
for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) [3]. The program of work for the 
negotiations addresses four elements of governance: (1) MGRs, 
including benefit sharing; (2) Environmental Impact Assessments; (3) 
Area Based Management Tools, including marine protected areas); and 
(4) Capacity Building and Transfer of Marine Technology [2]. Unless the 
Member States agree on all of the elements, there will be no ILBI [2]. 
Negotiating the MGR element is challenging with few areas that coun-
tries agree upon [4]. This may derail the entire agreement unless new 
options are explored to overcome the impasse. 
In November 2019, the President of the intergovernmental confer-
ence (IGC) released a revised Draft Text that consolidated governance 
options raised at previous negotiating sessions [5]. This states that the 
primary objective of the ILBI is ‘to ensure the [long-term] conservation 
and sustainable use’ of marine biodiversity in ABNJ (draft article 2). 
While the text is for discussion purposes only, the objectives and 
framework of the MGR element appear to focus only on the Convention 
on Biological Diversity’s (CBD) [6] concept of access and benefit sharing 
(ABS), without consideration of broader concepts of equity, or other 
tools to achieve equity, conservation and sustainable use. 
The 1992 CBD and its supplementary agreement the 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Nagoya Protocol) [7], provide the basis of the international 
framework for ABS within national jurisdiction. The CBD recognises 
sovereign rights over genetic resources and encourages countries to 
provide access to their genetic resources in return for a share in the 
monetary or non-monetary benefits from their use (article 15). Two core 
legal and institutional processes have evolved since the CBD entered into 
force to achieve this in practice:  
 An administrative (government) process for regulating access to 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge for their 
utilisation, through prior informed consent and permitting; and  
 A contractual process for determining how the benefits arising from 
the utilisation of genetic resources are ‘fairly and equitably’ shared 
between users and providers (on mutually agreed terms). 
ABNJ present particular environmental, geo-political, legal and so-
cial contexts that vary considerably from the biodiversity and genetic 
resources envisaged by the CBD. For example, most of the deep ocean is 
located in ABNJ, an environment presenting high pressures, stable low 
temperatures (~4 C) and low oxygen concentrations, meaning that 
organisms grow very slowly in this environment and that environmental 
damage can take decades or centuries to repair. Trenches, forming less 
than 1% of the ocean area, are isolated ecosystems where unique life-
forms may have evolved over millions of years. Many other unique en-
vironments exist in ABNJs that have extraordinarily high diversity of 
marine macro- and micro- organisms. The marine biotechnology in-
dustry is interested in these unique organisms as biological diversity 
translates to chemical and genetic diversity, leading to the discovery of 
new products and processes. However, with no sovereign rights recog-
nised in ABNJ (in contrast to the CBD) there is no legally recognised 
‘provider’ entitled to prior informed consent and a share of the benefits 
from genetic resource use under bilateral arrangements. Instead the ILBI 
needs to conceive an ABS system that is not dependent on this trans-
actional approach but still creates incentives for governments and 
stakeholders to be transparent about collection and use of MGRs of ABNJ 
and to share benefits from their use. With potentially billions of or-
ganisms not yet discovered in the most remote marine areas of the globe, 
the scope of a model based on the CBD, where enforcement for benefit 
sharing is dependent on proving a link with an entitlement for the 
original access, would be enormous. There are other ABS models that 
narrow the scope of their regimes such as the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation’s International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) [8] and the World Health Organi-
sations’ Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework [9]. These 
multilateral systems tailor the ABS concept to the special circumstances 
for biological resource use within their scope to achieve a particular 
purpose - food and health security goals respectively. 
This article explores the challenges and opportunities associated 
with MGRs of ABNJ, including access, benefit sharing and monitoring. 
We argue that attempting to retrofit the CBD’s concept of access and ‘fair 
and equitable’ benefit sharing to the unique circumstances of ABNJ 
could lead to unintended consequences, such as an inequitable and 
inefficient utilisation of ocean resources. 
While ideally countries would design an MGR policy from scratch 
that takes into account ABNJ’s unique characteristics, to date they have 
more narrowly focused on the CBD’s framing of ABS during negotia-
tions. We propose a way forward, called the Tiered Approach, navi-
gating between ‘open’ or ‘restrictive’ positions on ABS but in a way that 
supports biodiversity conservation and fosters scientific research, pro-
tects traditional and local knowledge, operationalises international 
collaboration and promotes consistency with existing MGR benefit 
sharing frameworks within national jurisdiction. 
The article concludes that MGR governance should be considered in 
the broader context of equity, sustainable use and biodiversity conser-
vation, offering a range of tools and approaches that complement, but 
are more diverse and flexible than the ABS concept alone. Strong 
engagement with key stakeholders, such as scientists, the private sector, 
local communities and traditional knowledge holders will likely increase 
the odds that any new framework will not only be practical and remain 
relevant in decades to come but also provide a platform that will foster 
research, collaboration and marine conservation. 
2. The proposed ‘ABS one-size-fits all approach’ to MGRs of 
ABNJ under the ILBI 
This section argues that while negotiating parties recognise that 
ABNJ is a unique jurisdictional area, they continue to import objectives, 
values and tools based on the CBD’s concept of ABS that suits genetic 
resource transactions (material and knowledge exchanges) within na-
tional jurisdictions. First, a narrow view of the CBD’s approach to equity 
and technology transfer has been adopted as the basis of MGR gover-
nance, rather than conservation of MGRs, equity and efficiency as 
envisaged by UNCLOS. Second, the CBD’s approach of regulating access 
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to MGRs based on the form and location of the tangible or intangible 
genetic resource, compounds the governance challenges already faced in 
national jurisdictions. Third, a ‘one size fits all approach’ to benefit 
sharing and monitoring, imports the CBD’s model of benefit sharing that 
is dependent on establishing a direct link with access (the transaction 
approach) – an approach that would consume enormous resources for 
monitoring and compliance. 
2.1. Proposed MGR governance objectives 
While UNCLOS does not directly provide a framework for MGR 
governance in ABNJ, its vision for a legal order for the seas and oceans 
includes the ‘equitable and efficient utilisation of [the ocean’s] re-
sources’, Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this 
Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal 
order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international 
communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and 
oceans, the equitable and efficient utilisation of their resources, the 
conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and 
preservation of the marine environment … [preamble] 
2.1.1. The missing link to conservation of MGRs 
The overall objective of the ILBI in the Draft Text is to ‘ensure the 
long-term conservation and sustainable use of marine biological di-
versity of ABNJ through effective implementation of the relevant pro-
visions of the [UNCLOS] and further international cooperation and 
coordination’ (preamble). However, the draft objectives of the specific 
MGR governance section of the ILBI at the time of writing are more 
narrowly focused:  
1. Build the capacity of developing States Parties to access and utilize 
MGRs of ABNJ;  
2. Promote the generation of knowledge and technological innovations;  
3. Promote the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the 
utilisation of MGRs of ABNJ;  
4. Promote the development and transfer of marine technology;  
5. Contribute to the realization of a just and equitable international 
economic order (draft article 7). 
These objectives focus largely on access, benefit sharing and tech-
nology transfer as the means of achieving MGR governance in ABNJ. 
Conspicuously absent are goals for ensuring the long-term conservation 
of marine biological diversity. Although many would argue that the ABS 
concept inherently supports conservation as an economic incentive, 
conservation has largely fallen out of the spotlight within CBD ABS 
discussions; this is contrary to the early years of implementation when 
ABS measures, contracts and partnerships often required conservation 
measures [10]. Today, it is more common for governments to consider 
benefits for conservation to result indirectly from sharing of materials, 
scientific data, forms of capacity building and contractual agreements 
between parties. However, there is little or no published research 
providing evidence that the ABS transaction per se is an effective tool for 
conservation of genetic resources (as opposed to equitable use) [10]. 
Tier 5 of the Tiered Approach (section 3.5 below) identifies ways in 
which the missing link to conservation can be more directly incorpo-
rated into MGR governance under the ILBI. 
2.1.2. The missing link to UNCLOS values for benefit sharing 
The Draft Text imports the CBD’s values of ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ into 
MGR benefit sharing, terms that are undefined but underlie the trans-
action between provider and user of a particular resource within na-
tional jurisdiction. The CBD leaves what is ‘fair and equitable’ to be 
negotiated between the parties. In the absence of an identified ‘provider’ 
of MGRs in ABNJ with whom to negotiate and share benefits or a 
contractual mechanism for achieving benefit sharing, it is unclear how 
these values alone can guide behaviour under the ILBI’s MGR 
framework. The President of the negotiations has said that the ILBI’s 
provisions ‘should be fully consistent with the provisions of’ UNCLOS 
[5]. In the absence of express provisions on MGRs under UNCLOS, its 
preamble might serve as a guide to the values that underlie MGR ex-
changes between countries. The preamble recognises the desirability of 
‘establishing a legal order for the seas and oceans’ that promotes the 
‘equitable and efficient utilisation of resources’ (emphasis added). The 
UNCLOS values of equity and efficiency apply to both living and 
non-living resources [11]. Section three on the Tiered Approach below 
demonstrates how incorporating UNCLOS values of ‘equity and effi-
ciency’ into designing an MGR governance framework can have a pro-
foundly different effect on guiding the achievement of conservation and 
sustainable use goals. 
2.2. Proposed MGR access framework 
The Draft Text proposes to achieve its objectives by requiring parties 
to take legislative, administrative or policy measures to ensure compli-
ance with the ILBI’s access arrangements, benefit sharing, monitoring 
and intellectual property restrictions [5]. 
Countries have not yet agreed whether the MGR provisions apply to 
in situ, ex situ and/or in silico MGRs and ‘derivatives’ of MGRs. However, 
the Draft Text proposes different access procedures depending on the 
form and location of the subject matter:  
 In situ access options include prior notification or permit or prior 
informed consent systems;  
 access to ex situ MGRs of ABNJ is proposed as ‘free and open’ 
(undefined);  
 access to in silico information or data is proposed as ‘facilitated’ 
(undefined); and  
 access to traditional knowledge associated with (or useful for 
unlocking the value of) MGRs of ABNJ would require the prior 
informed consent or approval and involvement of those holding this 
knowledge on mutually agreed terms. 
The CBD’s distinction between in situ and ex situ genetic resources is 
relevant in situations where a country can exercise control over its re-
sources but may cause confusion in ABNJ’s unique geo-political condi-
tions. In the ABNJ context where there are no sovereign rights to in situ 
MGRs, as soon as they are landed on the research vessel and the flag state 
jurisdiction becomes the relevant regulatory framework, they become ex 
situ and could be regarded as ‘free and open’. This means that unless the 
ILBI clearly defines what it means by ‘in situ’, ‘ex situ’ and ‘access’, most 
MGRs of ABNJ will be ‘free and open’ and incapable of being subject to a 
form of benefit sharing that depends on maintaining the chain of custody 
of the resources from the point of access. It is therefore concerning that 
there is no explanation in the ILBI about the relationship with domestic 
ABS laws that already control ex situ genetic resources located in na-
tional jurisdiction. 
By adding a separate (undefined) procedure for accessing in silico 
information or data about MGRs, the ILBI is further complicating one of 
the biggest challenges facing national ABS frameworks – the demateri-
alisation of genetic resources. There is ongoing debate in other ABS 
forums (CBD [12], ITPGRFA [13] and the PIP Framework [14]) about 
whether including intangible aspects of genetic resources such as digital 
sequence information (DSI) as the subject matter of ABS transactions is 
feasible in practice, and if so, how benefit sharing and monitoring can be 
practically effected [15,16]. Section 3.3 analyses this debate to propose 
an alternative approach to governance of information separate to the 
physical material. 
2.3. Proposed benefit sharing and monitoring frameworks 
The Draft Text takes a ‘one size fits all’ approach to benefit sharing 
and monitoring, which appear to apply equally to all forms of MGRs in 
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ABNJ, regardless of whether they are in situ, ex situ or in silico. It draws 
on the CBD concept of ABS where benefits are triggered only by the act 
of access or utilisation (negotiators have not yet agreed on the options). 
It is unclear how this link is to be proven in practice for ex situ MGRs if 
access is to be ‘free and open.’ This causal link may also dispropor-
tionately require the initial researcher (rather than downstream users) 
to provide benefits at the time of access, before any commercial value of 
the genetic resource is unlocked. 
3. The Tiered Approach 
Given the deficiencies described, we propose a Tiered Approach for 
accessing MGRs and sharing the benefits associated with their use. The 
current iteration of the ILBI Draft Text outlines an ABS system modelled 
from the CBD and Nagoya Protocol that were designed for accessing 
genetic resources within national jurisdictions. The Tiered Approach is a 
novel approach to ABS that better suits the unique nature of MGRs of 
ABNJ. 
The purpose of the Tiered Approach is to identify the building blocks 
for a sustainable, equitable and efficient framework that negotiators can 
tailor to meet the agreed purposes of MGR governance and to satisfy 
individual country interests. It integrates MGR governance with other 
ILBI elements (Environmental Impact Assessment, Area Based Manage-
ment Tools and Capacity Building/Technology Transfer) as well as ar-
rangements for MGR governance within national jurisdiction to promote 
a coherent global system for the conservation and sustainable use of 
MGRs. It also builds on lessons learned from challenges facing other ABS 
systems, including managing traceability across jurisdictions and 
addressing challenges posed by DSI which does not involve the exchange 
of physical materials. Also incorporated is the intent of Draft Text op-
tions and some of the ideas from innovative governance proposals such 
as the OPEN system [17]. Finally, the Tiered Approach attempts to find a 
balance between creating a flexible regime that: (1) uses obligations and 
incentives for regulating MGRs of ABNJ so that their benefits can be 
equitably shared; and (2) minimises the cost of governance infrastruc-
ture and the regulatory burden on low income countries and researchers. 
Table 1 highlights the key differences between the current Draft Text 
approach and the Tiered Approach. 
The Tiered Approach has five tiers that suggests governance ele-
ments around the following activities:  
1. Collection of MGRs in ABNJ (Tier 1);  
2. ILBI scope activities concerning physical materials of ABNJ 
(including contextual information) (Tier 2);  
3. ILBI scope activities using DSI separately from the physical sample 
(Tier 3);  
4 Access and use of traditional knowledge (Tier 4); and  
5 Conservation of MGRs in ABNJ (Tier 5). 
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the Tiered Approach’s key infra-
structure outlined in this section. 
3.1. Tier 1 collection and storage of MGRs in ABNJ 
3.1.1. ABNJ Activity Notification and Monitoring System (ANeMONe) 
For now, marine scientific research in ABNJ is challenging due to the 
expense and difficulties of travelling to and operating in the High Seas. 
Most expeditions involve cruises by international partnerships of a range 
of research institutions and activities, one of which may be to collect 
samples that might be relevant to MGR research [18]. This means that a 
system of prior notification must be broad enough to feed into each of 
the ILBI elements but not burden the researchers with reporting re-
quirements on collection for potential finds (discoveries) that are un-
known at the prior notification stage. 
An ABNJ Activity Notification and Monitoring System (ANeMONe), 
which could be part of the Clearing House Mechanism proposed in the 
Draft Text, could offer researchers a one-stop-shop for assessing whether 
their activities trigger MGR, Environmental Impact Assessment, Area 
Based Management Tools and/or Capacity Building/Technology 
Transfer obligations and opportunities. In return for cruise ‘prior noti-
fication’ and/or cruise registration, a designated ILBI body could allo-
cate a ‘cruise identifier’ with information about ILBI requirements and 
matches from a Capacity Building database. This database could be 
managed as part of the Clearing House Mechanism to ‘match’ providers 
and users of capacity building initiatives (e.g. low income country re-
searchers seeking on board experience). Real time vessel tracking da-
tabases are already available2; however, developers of the notification 
or registration system would need to take into account some countries’ 
national security requirements. A notification system with publicly 
available cruise registration information could offer significant benefits 
to the deep-sea research community, for example, enhanced coopera-
tion, efficiency for cruise planning and capacity building opportunities 
[18]. 
3.1.2. Monitoring under the Facilitated Information and Sample Sharing 
Hub (FISSH): traceability v track and trace 
The Tiered Approach makes a distinction between a monitoring 
system that serves a ‘track and trace’ function and one that serves a 
traceability function. The former is akin to a parcel tracking system, 
which records the location of the parcel at every point along the delivery 
chain. The latter is like an automobile recall system, where it is not 
necessary for manufacturers to track where the car is at every moment, 
or record whose custody it passes through, until there is a problem. Then 
the system will trace the product number and ownership (e.g. through a 
car registration system) to pinpoint the relevant car and issue a notice to 
the current owner. Track and trace (the former) is a common monitoring 
approach under national ABS laws that need to ‘prove’ the chain of 
custody of a genetic resource from the point of access - through to the 
hands of subsequent users in order to have a legal right to the share of 
benefits. However, using prior notification, identifiers and status reports 
as the foundation of a ‘track and trace’ system where benefits are tied 
directly to access (as proposed in the Draft Text) for potentially trillions 
of organisms from ABNJ covering 40% of the surface of the planet, is an 
inefficient use of infrastructure and funding. ABS laws within national 
jurisdiction have the advantage of a close contractual relationship be-
tween a user and provider where monitoring and compliance is built 
into the contract obligations, which is not possible in the ABNJ context. 
One option for ABNJ is to have any ‘track and trace’ system associated 
with a more targeted multilateral ABS system (see section 3.2 below). 
Another option is to develop a user-driven and transparent web- 
based traceability platform similar to the PIP Framework’s Influenza 
Virus Traceability Mechanism that records the movements of influenza 
viruses between laboratories.3 Fig. 2 indicates where a proposed 
Table 1 
Key differences between Draft Text and Tiered Approach.  
Draft Text approach (November 2019) Tiered Approach 
Heavy reliance on the CBD access and 
benefit sharing (ABS) concept as a 
governance tool 
Broader conservation and sustainable use 
tools and integration with other ILBI 
elements 
Importing CBD values (fairness & 
equity) 
UNCLOS values driven approach (equity 
& efficiency) 
Subject matter approach to ABS and 
monitoring (in situ, ex situ, in silico, 
traditional knowledge) 
Activities approach to ABS and 
monitoring (collection, research/ 
development and market engagement) 
One size fits all model for benefit 
sharing 
Benefit sharing tiers based on 
proportionality, equity and efficiency  
2 E.g. https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/centerx:84.9/centery: 
-18.3/zoom:2.  
3 See https://extranet.who.int/ivtm/. 
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Facilitated Information and Sample Sharing Hub (FISSH) could offer a 
traceability system but not necessarily a ‘track and trace’ function for 
compliance, but still deliver information that supports benefit sharing. 
This is an information hub rather than a database for collection and 
storage of information, more akin to a transparency mechanism showing 
movement of the materials from user to user through the use of identi-
fiers. It would be up to the ILBI to determine how ABNJ identifiers used 
to trace the materials would be assigned – most likely through the Draft 
Text’s Clearing House Mechanism (see below). The FISSH information 
hub could show linked identifiers assigned by databases such as acces-
sion numbers from the International Nucleotide Sequence Data Collab-
oration and digital object identifiers (DOI) from literary and other 
databases. 
As researchers do not know what MGRs they may find from ABNJ 
until sample validation in the laboratory weeks (or even years) after 
collection [18] and each water sample may contain millions of organ-
isms, the IBLI could take a bulk identifier approach instead of mandating 
a unique identifier for individual organisms and data as currently pro-
posed in the Draft Text. The ‘bulk collection identifier’ could stay with 
the MGR as part of the metadata, which includes the relevant informa-
tion described in the study and provenance information necessary to 
comply with the best scientific practices for publication and national 
ABS regimes [19]. This bulk identifier could be traced in the FISSH and 
be updated with unique identifiers, linked to the bulk identifier, for 
specific samples and sequences as database technologies improve.4 The 
FISSH could be tied with an End-user Due Diligence approach to 
monitoring and benefit sharing outlined in section 3.3 below. The ILBI 
could require or encourage States Parties (and provide incentives for 
non-state parties) to integrate the ILBI collection identification system 
into their own monitoring systems for MGRs of ABNJ used within their 
national jurisdictions. 
3.1.3. Conservation and sharing of collected samples and data 
A fundamental tenet of the Tiered Approach is to find practical ways 
of achieving the conservation and sharing of collected samples of MGRs 
of ABNJ and their associated data, from which further discoveries and 
knowledge generation can be made. Upon collection, the Draft Text 
proposes mandatory deposit of samples and data in ‘open source’ plat-
forms. MGR conservation and scientific advances will benefit from free 
access to samples and associated data, but the legal and scientific 
meaning and extent of ‘open’ access will vary with the individual fa-
cility/database protocols and any relevant national laws [20]. It is 
important to make the distinction between mandatory requirements to 
deposit samples in an ex situ facility separate to the collector’s facility for 
sharing with others and requirements to share samples and data per se. A 
deposit scheme would require enormous infrastructure and conservation 
risks associated with single large collections compared to distributed 
collections. From a scientist’s point of view, it may not be possible to 
take identical or multiple samples and complications may arise from 
potential of overlap of work on multiple sample sets. From a curator’s 
point of view, there are significant costs for the maintenance and storage 
of physical specimens, so any mandatory deposit scheme would need to 
include capacity building and associated resources (e.g. human, cost, 
infrastructure, etc.) for ex situ facilities [18]. Transferring samples to ex 
situ facilities in other countries may subject the materials and data to 
another set of national ABS laws and reporting obligations, increasing 
benefit sharing and reporting burdens on the initial collector. 
Fig. 1. Key infrastructure of the Tiered Approach.  
4 See e.g. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/biosample/. 
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However, requirements to share samples and data can still be ach-
ieved without mandatory deposit schemes and infrastructure. There are 
initiatives within the scientific community for open access to genetic 
resources and data upon publication5 [21]. The FISSH proposed under 
the Tiered Approach facilitates other researchers’ access to materials 
and data while not requiring the original researcher to deposit dupli-
cates or sub-samples in external ex situ facilities. As with the PIP 
Framework Influenza Virus Traceability System on which it is based, 
researchers can approach the institution holding the original or trans-
ferred collections to ask for a sub-sample or data for their own research. 
This online system provides information on ‘In-House’ storage (e.g. in 
the holder’s laboratory or a biorepository) and sharing of samples and 
data, together with a real-time reporting of the movement and uses of 
samples and data. FISSH can be linked to the ILBI’s proposed Clearing 
House Mechanism and biobanks,6 which could also offer a forum for 
improving research institutions’ social licence to operate if they share 
the materials and data. Similar to the Norwegian Marine Biobank Mar-
Bank,7 multiple non-competing uses on the same sample are permitted 
depending on sample quantity and suitability for intended use. This 
would mean data is acquired on the same sample in parallel rather than 
sequentially, increasing the knowledge base on MGRs exponentially. 
3.2. Tier 2 ILBI scope activities concerning physical materials of ABNJ 
(including contextual information) 
3.2.1. Scope 
All MGRs collected from ABNJ will be eventually located within 
Fig. 2. Approach to benefit sharing under Tier 2 – collection and storage of MGRs.  
5 See e.g. https://www.nature.com/authors/editorial_policies/availability. 
html. 
6 See e.g. CABI: https://www.cabi.org/and also WFCC: http://www.wfcc.inf 
o/guidelines/and https://www.iode.org/.  
7 https://www.imr.no/marbank/en. 
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national jurisdiction, which may cause confusion if there are different 
access or use regimes for in situ, ex situ and in silico MGRs applying to the 
one research activity (see section 2 above). The Draft Text’s artificial 
distinction between the form and location of the genetic resource does 
not recognise that unlocking value of the physical material often re-
quires information about the genetic resource. To avoid the monitoring 
challenges and disproportionate benefit sharing and reporting re-
sponsibility on the initial researcher arising from the Draft Text’s three 
distinct access regimes outlined in section 2 above, Tier 2 targets the 
activities of MGR users, regardless of whether or not they relate to the 
form of in situ or ex situ resources and associated information. Tier 3 
recognises that there are special additional governance challenges for 
managing the use of information separately from the physical resource, 
which is explored in section 3.3 below. 
For activities that fall within scope of benefit sharing under the 
Tiered Approach, it is important to make a distinction between: (1) 
benefit sharing that is dependent on access (i.e. the ‘ABS’ transaction of 
the CBD and Nagoya Protocol), such as mandatory benefits under a 
multilateral system and benefits from MGRs of ABNJ managed under 
national bilateral ABS laws; and (2) benefit sharing that is not tied to 
access such as conservation of voluntary duplicate samples and a 
capacity-building database. A combination of the two may also be 
feasible. 
3.2.2. Approaches to benefit sharing that are dependent on access or 
utilisation of MGRs – a ‘tied’ benefit sharing system 
Currently the Draft Text includes all MGRs of ABNJ in its system of 
benefits that arise from the access to or utilisation of MGRs of ABNJ. At 
the time of writing, countries have not yet decided if the trigger will be 
access and/or utilisation but if benefit sharing is expected from ex situ 
materials, subsequent users would also need to be captured by ABS 
obligations. As discussed in Tier 1, this is a more ‘closed ABS system’ that 
would require extensive infrastructure to track and trace the MGR as it 
passes through the possession of subsequent users in order to require 
benefit sharing from the access or use of the resources. 
A more targeted ABS framework using an ‘open but facilitated’ ac-
cess multilateral system may be one option for an efficient means of 
achieving both equity and scientific advancement. Fig. 3 illustrates an 
example approach under an ABNJ Benefit Sharing System (ABySS) and 
Open Multilateral Mechanism that targets ABS to those MGRs in a 
defined geographical area (such as hydrothermal vents that only cover 
50 km2 of the sea floor). This example of defining scope was chosen 
because the high concentration of biodiversity in these areas has sig-
nificant potential for commercial applications and/or economic returns, 
and for conservation and scientific advancement [22]. This targeted 
‘tied system’ of ABS could include a registration process for collection of 
MGRs in ABNJ hydrothermal vents that integrates ABS with MGR con-
servation objectives.8 
Exceptions could be made for certain ABySS materials to remain 
outside of the registration and multilateral system and fall under na-
tional bilateral ABS laws, if there were practical or strategic consider-
ations, as agreed by the ILBI decision making body.9 All other ABNJ 
materials not within the ABySS system would also fall under national 
bilateral ABS laws. The ILBI could encourage State Parties to incorporate 
collection identifiers within their monitoring systems and encourage 
MGR users to share some benefits in accordance with the ILBI from 
MGRs of ABNJ used within their jurisdictions (if origin can be estab-
lished, such as through the FISSH in Tier 1). Complementary incentive 
mechanisms identified in 3.2.4 below could have a strong role in 
encouraging stakeholders to participate in the ILBI benefit sharing 
regimes. 
Any targeted benefit sharing system that is tied to access would need 
to ensure that there is not a disproportionate responsibility for benefit 
sharing on the initial researcher collecting the materials rather than 
downstream users, as may be the case in the Draft Text’s current 
approach (see section 2.3). This could involve a tiered approach to 
triggering obligations depending on whether it is a depositing activity or 
a subsequent use activity. For example:  
 The depositor of ABySS materials could choose;  
(a) immediate access without restrictions to genetic materials, 
sequence data, research data and other information for other 
researchers with no further benefit sharing obligations; or  
(b) defined short exclusivity period (e.g. for publication or patent 
application) subject to upfront payment to a fund (e.g. an ILBI 
benefit sharing fund) and periodic reporting requirements to the 
ILBI [17] 10;  
 A recipient of ABySS materials could choose from a range of benefit 
sharing and reporting options that become more onerous if they 
restrict access to the result of their research or products ‘derived 
from’ or ‘based on’ ABySS materials. 
The wording of these options would need careful legal and scientific 
consideration to avoid loopholes for benefit sharing. 
While the ABySS example is raised in this paper as one way of finding 
a compromise between those countries seeking a share of monetary 
benefits from MGRs of ABNJ and those seeking unrestricted access to the 
same resources, there are clear challenges for multilateral benefit- 
sharing models tied to access. First, existing multilateral funds such as 
under the ITPGRFA and PIP Frameworks have poor records of effec-
tiveness, equity and transparency. Second, there are significant chal-
lenges for defining the scope of resources to be included in a targeted 
multilateral system. For example, after years of governance challenges 
with a defined list of genetic resources within scope, the ITPGRFA’s 
Governing Body continues to debate a proposed amendment to the 
treaty’s scope to move from an ‘opt in’ system based on the list to an ‘opt 
out’ system where all plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
are within scope, subject to Party declarations for exclusions [24]. Third, 
some of the challenges with a mandatory deposit of duplicate samples 
identified in Tier 1 remain. For example, even if the ABySS only includes 
samples collected under the Tier 1 registration system from hydrother-
mal vents (less than 1  10  5% instead of 40% of the surface area of the 
planet), one water sample may still contain millions of target or 
non-target living entities that may require tracing and inclusion in the 
multilateral system. Finally, having both multilateral and national ABS 
systems that potentially apply to the same MGRs found within and 
beyond national jurisdiction could create loopholes unless the purpose 
and scope of the multilateral system is clearly defined and adopted by 
user countries. Ideally, the globe could start again with a ‘Whole Global 
Ecosystem Multilateral Benefit Sharing Mechanism’ instead of separate 
CBD/Nagoya Protocol and BBNJ treaties that artificially carve up sub-
ject matter scope based on jurisdictional areas. Such a system is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
3.2.3. Approaches to benefit sharing that is not dependent on access or 
utilisation of MGRs – an ‘untied’ benefit sharing system 
One of the most valuable outcomes of any biodiscovery research is 
greater knowledge of biodiversity [25]. This outcome is not dependent 
on tying a benefit sharing mechanism to access through a track and trace 
system. Instead, the proposed simple FISSH system in Tier 1 could 
provide information about the location and uses of MGRs of ABNJ as a 
valuable transparency tool for decreasing overlap between research 
8 See the UN General Assembly’s call for States to take urgent action to 
protect biodiversity in hydrothermal vents from harmful activities [23]. 
9 See the similar proposed ‘opt-out’ approach under the Plant Treaty dis-
cussed below. 
10 Note the scientific community’s movement against any embargo on 
sequence data [21]. 
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efforts and improving coordination and cooperation. Once MGRs and 
data are accessible through this system, people throughout the globe 
could use them to address environmental, economic and societal needs, 
providing local solutions to local problems with local benefits. The 
FISSH could be combined with the Capacity Building database to match 
users of samples and data with researchers seeking to bring new research 
capacities back to their national contexts (see 3.1 above). 
Figs. 2–6 indicate the range of benefit sharing outcomes that are not 
tied to the activity of accessing physical materials including: country 
incentives to contribute to the benefit sharing database (section 3.1) or 
ILBI conservation objectives (section 2.1); market based, scientific 
prestige and private sector incentives to share the benefits of MGR 
research and commercial applications (section 3.3); and private or 
public direct contributions to a possible benefit sharing fund. 
3.2.4. Innovative approaches to promoting benefit sharing – end user Due 
Diligence approach 
An alternative to a ‘track and trace’ system from access to final use/ 
product is an End-user Due Diligence approach to monitoring and 
benefit sharing. This requires motivation for the end user of a product to 
share benefits and report uses of MGRs of ABNJ and associated infor-
mation or traditional and local knowledge either through ‘stick’ or 
‘carrot’ measures. One option for ‘stick’ measures could be for the ILBI to 
require a CBD checkpoint11 alert for products containing a unique 
identifier that is associated with species linked to ABNJ bulk collection 
identifier under the FISSH system for traceability (see section 3.1). To 
clear the checkpoint, the onus would be on the user to demonstrate 
benefit sharing or disprove that their product relates to those in a 
collection identifier. 
Fig. 3. Approach to benefit sharing under Tier 2 - use and transfer activities of the physical sample and associated information.  
11 E.g. patent, export or research offices. 
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‘Carrot’ measures could include a range of options. Market-based 
incentives could harness consumer demand for more transparency and 
sustainability along value chains. Initiatives like the Union for Ethical 
BioTrade’s verification and certification programs for biodiversity- 
based ingredients promote compliance with legal requirements on 
ABS, establish broader voluntary measures for benefit sharing along 
supply chains, and allow companies to communicate on their commit-
ments, efforts and achievements.12 Scientific ‘Prestige Economy’ in-
centives could include an ILBI system of ‘trusted ABNJ researchers’ if 
they proactively engage with ILBI benefit sharing (e.g. the Tier 1 Ca-
pacity Building database) or include ABS metadata (e.g. country of 
origin) in databases to assist with traceability. Such engagement could 
be in return for certain privileges (e.g. more streamlined procedures for 
docking in foreign ports) or a condition of a research grant process. 
Private sector mechanisms include options similar to the Global 
Biosafety Compact, which is a private contract between its members 
(private companies, public research facilities and governments) regu-
lating for example their stewardship obligations in relation to biodi-
versity [27]. Engaging these companies directly in benefit sharing 
through a similar compact that improves their social licence to operate 
could be a valuable benefit sharing option. Finally, ILBI benefit sharing 
could be tied to specific Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to 
achieve Agenda 2030,13 giving countries an opportunity to showcase 
their commitment to SDG’s through their Voluntary National Reviews. 
3.3. Tier 3 ILBI scope activities using DSI separately from the physical 
sample 
ABS forums continue to debate whether it is possible or practical to 
regulate genetic information used separately from the physical sample 
Fig. 4. Approach to benefit sharing under Tier 3 – use of information separate from the physical sample.  
12 https://www.ethicalbiotrade.org. 13 https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/. 
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such as DSI [15]. Negotiators have not yet agreed whether to include ‘in 
silico’ (undefined) MGRs in the ILBI but the Draft Text proposes their 
access to be ‘facilitated’ (also undefined). The Tiered Approach avoids 
the intractable debate over categorising the meaning and scope of ‘in 
silico’ (the subject matter approach to ABS) and instead focuses on the 
activity of using MGR information (including DSI) separately from the 
physical sample. The Laird and Wynberg 2018 fact-finding study for the 
CBD [12] observed that the terminology and meaning of DSI varies 
across international and national policy processes as well as across the 
scientific community and databases. They found that DSI ‘permeates 
nearly every branch of the life sciences and modern biology today’ (at 
9). In practice, commercial research strategies are relying less on 
collection of physical samples and more on DSI. On the other hand, 
academic groups continue to have an interest in physical sample col-
lections because they provide information that the DSI alone cannot, 
including epigenetic modifications, transcription patterns and 
interactions between organisms and their environment. The study sug-
gests that interests in unique organisms from extreme environments, for 
example, may increase alongside digital technologies. For these reasons, 
the Tiered Approach recognises that DSI will also fall under Tier 2, but 
this section argues that using the information separately to the physical 
resource requires a different approach to meeting ABS objectives. 
There are significant challenges for monitoring information (e.g. 
DSI) that is separate to the physical material for the purpose of benefit 
sharing. For example, a researcher’s computer program (e.g. a Basic 
Local Alignment Search Tool) may access (scan) millions of sequences 
for patterns or information they are looking for in order to create a 
research outcome. Tracing the origin of each of these sequences is 
impractical (even if a unique identifier could be attached to the meta-
data), as is knowing which parts have contributed to the outcome so that 
the ILBI could enforce benefit sharing. The FISSH system (Tier 1) could 
go so far as recording when a MGR user enters DSI into a database in 
Fig. 5. Approach to benefit sharing under Tier 4 – access and use of Traditional of Local Knowledge within ILBI scope.  
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return for an accession number (e.g. from the International Nucleotide 
Sequence Data Collaboration) but not record each movement after 
leaving open access databases. There are initiatives for connecting the 
multitude of databases14 into a decentralised network of databases, 
which could improve the efficiency of this system, but there may be 
difficult technical, management and legal questions around interoper-
ability and copyright infringement [26]. The End User Due Diligence 
approach to promoting benefit sharing explained in Tier 2 could apply to 
DSI used separately from the physical material, without requiring each 
movement to be tracked. The ‘stick’ options such as checkpoints and 
‘carrot’ options that improve companies or research institution’s social 
licence to operate could provide motivation for users to share benefits 
and report uses of DSI concerning MGRs of ABNJ in a final product. 
3.4. Tier 4 access and use of traditional and local knowledge 
The Tiered Approach moves away from treating traditional knowl-
edge as a static body of knowledge that is characterised as belonging in 
the past, and towards recognition that it is a dynamic system of 
knowledge, culture and ways of life that are constantly changing. It 
recognises that there is a growing and diverse body of national and local 
laws and protocols that build frameworks around how people can access 
and use traditional and local knowledge associated with genetic re-
sources and share the benefits from its use, primarily through prior 
informed consent and mutually agreed terms. The Tiered Approach 
recognises that there can be no ‘one size fits all approach’ to these ac-
tivities under the ILBI because the knowledge is not an abstract thing 
that can be traded, but rather is embedded in diverse cultural systems 
and contexts. 
Potential users of MGRs within national jurisdiction may have 
challenges for identifying the knowledge holders with whom to 
Fig. 6. Approach to benefit sharing under Tier 5 – conservation of MGRs within ABNJ.  
14 E.g. http://www.pimrisportal.org/global-marine. 
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negotiate for the access and use of their knowledge. The Tiered 
Approach suggests extending the mandate of the proposed ILBI Scien-
tific and Technical Body to include other knowledge systems including 
traditional and local knowledge. Indigenous Peoples and Local Com-
munities could provide their expertise to find solutions for respectfully 
and efficiently incorporating traditional and local knowledge into the 
ILBI framework and infrastructure. For example, they could consider a 
system of traditional knowledge identifiers (similar to the collection 
identifiers in Tier 1) that links with the traceability mechanism (FISSH). 
They could develop a system for resolving how potential users would 
address situations where several Indigenous Peoples or Local Commu-
nities, possibly in different countries, hold the same or similar tradi-
tional knowledge associated to MGR. They could also explore how 
traditional and local knowledge could be incorporated into the End-User 
Due Diligence system under the Tiered Approach, including exploring 
motivations for engaging with benefit sharing (‘carrot options’) such as 
market-based incentives for researchers and the private sector. 
3.5. Tier 5 conservation of MGRs in ABNJ 
Part II of the Draft Text focuses on extractive activities (and sus-
tainable use) relating to MGRs of ABNJ but overlooks other conservation 
considerations of MGR use in ABNJ (see section 2.1 above). These 
considerations include the unexplored effects on the genome of MGRs in 
ABNJ from the use of genetically engineered organisms and aquaculture 
selective breeding in the High Seas [28], or even alien biological 
contamination from the dumping of returning space equipment in ABNJ 
[29]. 
The ILBI’s Draft Text relies on ABS to promote technology/knowl-
edge transfer and capacity building through soft obligations that only 
‘encourage’ benefits to be used to ‘contribute to the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of ABNJ’ (draft article 11 
(4)). The ILBI could make this obligation mandatory and formally 
recognise that conservation and sustainable use of MGRs, (particularly 
access, use and transfer) are inextricably linked to the Environmental 
Impact Assessment, Area Based Management Tools and Capacity 
Building/Technology Transfer elements of the ILBI package and create 
more direct links between the elements to support conservation. Other 
MGR conservation objectives could include: promoting and sharing 
biodiversity surveys; promoting incentives for countries and commu-
nities to conserve marine biodiversity of ABNJ such as through national 
climate change mitigation, biosecurity and biosafety strategies; and 
protecting and restoring the genetic diversity of ABNJ marine entities, 
including vulnerable species. 
One example of a conservation aspect that is missing from the ILBI 
negotiations concerns the regulating the risks of harm caused by the 
effect of living modified organisms (LMOs) on their wild-type counter-
parts. The CBD’s Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 2000 (Protocol) [30] is an international framework 
for the safe movement and handling of movements of LMOs between 
countries. This biosafety framework includes a consent procedure be-
tween governments prior to LMO movements and detailed risk assess-
ment, precautionary decision making, risk management and emergency 
management frameworks.15 Significantly, it excludes from scope any 
movement of LMOs from the territory of a Party to ABNJ [31] and is 
silent about the use of LMOs in ABNJ. While the ILBI’s Draft Text has 
drawn on the CBD and Nagoya Protocol provisions that promote the 
sharing of technologies and MGRs, it is silent on biosafety issues in 
ABNJ. The Environmental Impact Assessment provisions of the Draft 
Text do not cover the consent, decision making and emergency 
management measures necessary to fill the gap in global biosafety in 
accordance with the Protocol. During the preparatory work leading up 
to the IGC, there was no mention of implementation gaps for managing 
the negative effects of genetic technology transfer.16 The International 
Council of Environmental Law was the first to raise biosafety as an issue 
for consideration during the second negotiating session for the ILBI17 but 
the issue remains neglected to date. 
Any future agreement ‘regarding intentional transboundary move-
ments of LMOs’ must be consistent with and ‘not result in a lower level of 
protection than that provided for by the Protocol’ (article 14(1)). This 
means that if the ILBI was to strengthen the conservation objectives of 
MGR governance by protecting the genetic diversity of MGRs in ABNJ, it 
would need to fill the global gap in biosafety governance with a consent 
mechanism for intentional movements and notification mechanism for 
unintentional movements of LMOs from ABNJ to national jurisdiction 
(and vice versa). It would also require the establishment of a body 
capable of giving and receiving consent or notification, and duties for 
information sharing, environmental impact assessment, precautionary 
decision-making, emergency management measures, monitoring and 
review and liability and redress measures. 
4. Conclusion 
The paradox of current approaches to ABS for genetic resources 
within national jurisdiction is that by seeking to promote benefit sharing 
from the utilisation of genetic resources, the regulatory and monitoring 
tools establish access requirements and restrictions which are so com-
plex that they discourage research and projects seeking to generate in-
formation and other benefits. Yet seeking benefit sharing in a mandatory 
‘open access’ approach also creates a paradox: it breaks the chain of 
custody that is necessary for tracing access to benefit sharing and would 
require enclosing users in an extensive monitoring system that contra-
dicts the freedom of open access. 
The Draft Text’s separate access regimes based on whether MGRs are 
in situ (‘notification’), ex situ (‘free and open’) or in silico (‘facilitated’) 
are likely to lead to unnecessary complexity and confusion for users and 
those implementing the monitoring systems, particularly as the same 
research activity is likely to use all three forms of MGRs. The Tiered 
Approach proposes a different approach to access: triggering obligations 
based on activities of collection, research and development and market 
engagement, rather than the form and location of MGRs. It also embeds 
best scientific practices and protects traditional and local knowledge, 
while ensuring coherence with national ABS laws and promoting benefit 
sharing to foster conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biodiversity. 
The Draft text’s one-size-fits-all benefit sharing and monitoring sys-
tem creates a disproportionate responsibility on upstream users of 
MGRs, especially on those conducting basic research, without direct 
gains for conservation and equitable use of marine biodiversity. 
Attempting to include all MGRs of ABNJ in this kind of closed ABS 
system (with benefit sharing tied to access) will require enormous 
financial resources and monitoring infrastructure in the hope of 
distributing benefits from commercial applications. These commercial 
outcomes are likely to be overestimated [32] but even if they come to 
fruition, there are significant technical and legal challenges in moni-
toring and proving the origin of MGRs or data on which they are based, 
particularly if information is used separately from the physical resource. 
The Tiered Approach promotes benefit sharing and conservation 
initiatives that are not necessarily dependent on the ABS transaction, in 
other words, tied directly to accessing the MGRs. A range of benefits and 
conservation outcomes can be achieved at each stage of the ‘use’ 
15 It also has a supplementary agreement, the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supple-
mentary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
2010 that addresses response measures, liability and redress that might arise 
from the trans-border movement of LMOs. 
16 https://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom.htm.  
17 https://enb.iisd.org/oceans/bbnj/igc2/1apr.html#collapse4 (see the Daily 
Report for 1 April 2019). 
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continuum whether or not benefit sharing is directly tied to access: from 
exploration and collection (Tier 1); to use and subsequent access of 
physical materials (Tier 2); to access and use of information separate 
from the physical materials (Tier 3); to access and use of traditional and 
local knowledge (Tier 4); to conservation of MGRs in ABNJ (Tier 5). 
Where countries would like to include an ABS element into its broader 
governance framework that does tie benefit sharing to access, a more 
targeted multilateral system could simultaneously achieve some benefit 
sharing and facilitate open access and conservation outcomes depending 
on its agreed scope and purpose, but it will still have governance and 
monitoring challenges faced by other ABS frameworks. 
The ILBI is under negotiation in a world far removed from the one 
that created the original ABS concept as a solution to conserve and 
sustainably use genetic resources. Developments in technologies for 
discovering, collecting, using, storing and sharing genetic resources and 
associated information are continuing to push the boundaries of the 
current models of ABS. Instead of focusing on ABS as the sole approach 
to MGR governance in ABNJ, negotiators have a rare opportunity to 
implement the UNCLOS vision for an ‘equitable and efficient’ utilisation 
of MGRs and protection of the marine environment through a range of 
MGR governance options, including ABS, that are more suited to ABNJ’s 
unique environmental and geo-political conditions. 
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